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Predatory Pricing under the Areeda-Turner Test 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
I. Introduction 
 Few works of legal scholarship have had the impact enjoyed by Areeda and 
Turner's 1975 article on predatory and strategic pricing (Areeda and Turner, 1975).  
Every federal circuit court except the Eleventh has embraced some variation of the test 
that Areeda and Turner proposed.1  The Supreme Court has come very close to 
adopting it as well. 
 Proof of predatory pricing under the Areeda-Turner test requires two things; the 
sequence is not important, and most decisions focus on whichever element is disputed 
or easier to resolve:  First, the plaintiff must show a market structure and arrangement 
of firms such that the predator could rationally have predicted that the predatory pricing 
strategy would be profitable.  This requirement, typically called "recoupment," requires 
the plaintiff to show that, looking from the beginning of the predation campaign, the 
predator can reasonably anticipate that the present costs of predation will be more than 
offset by the present value of a future period of monopoly profits, thus making the 
strategy a sound investment.  Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's 
prices over a significant number of sales were below a relevant measure of cost, 
presumptively average variable cost (AVC) or, in some cases, marginal costs over a 
relatively short run. 
 While Areeda's and Turner's original 1975 article is generally associated with the 
second point, on price/cost relationships, it stated the recoupment requirement as well.  
Writing in response to the excessively subjective, intent-based tests that courts had 
been applying, they (1975, p. 698) concluded that: 
These vague formulations of the offense overlook the fact that predation in any 
meaningful sense cannot exist unless there is a temporary sacrifice of net revenues 
in the expectation of greater future gains. Indeed, the classically-feared case of 
predation has been the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of 
driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through higher profits 
earned in the absence of competition.  Thus, predatory pricing would make little 
economic sense to a potential predator unless he had (1) greater financial staying 
power than his rivals, and (2) a very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in 
the predatory campaign will be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals 
have been destroyed. 
                                                          
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.   My gratitude to Professor C. Scott 
Hemphill for commenting on a draft. 
1 On the Eleventh Circuit's position adopting an average total cost test see McGahee v. 
Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 
(1989).  On individual variations in the other Circuits, see Areeda and Hovenkamp (2015,  
¶724c3). 
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Later, in developing this recoupment requirement, Areeda and Turner (1975, pp. 698–
699) wrote: 
 
attention must also be given to the second prerequisite, which is less likely to occur. 
Although a predator may drive competitors into bankruptcy, their durable assets may 
remain in the market in the hands of others. Moreover, a firm can anticipate 
monopoly profits for only so long as its monopoly prices do not attract new entry. 
Losses incurred through predation could be regained in markets with very high 
barriers to entry. In many markets, however, and especially in those having a 
number of small rivals, entry barriers may be nonexistent or at least too low to 
preclude entry. Admittedly, a demonstrated willingness to indulge in predatory 
pricing might itself deter some smaller potential entrants, but it is unlikely to inhibit 
firms with resources comparable to those of the predator. Repeated predation in the 
same market, moreover, is not only costly but is likely to be easily detectable and 
thus the occasion for severe antitrust sanctions. The prospects of an adequate 
future payoff, therefore, will seldom be sufficient to motivate predation.  Indeed, 
proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely rare. 
 
 Nearly the entire balance of Areeda and Turner's article was devoted to the 
proper price-cost test.  For that reason the recoupment requirement is often not 
considered to be a part of the Areeda-Turner test, although it was clearly there.  This 
view was exacerbated by the fact that nearly all of the early controversy surrounding 
Areeda's and Turner's article swirled around the average variable cost (AVC) test, not 
the structural recoupment requirement.  Further, although the courts almost immediately 
began citing Areeda and Turner in predatory pricing cases, nearly all of the early 
citations were to issues that involved price-cost relationships, not to structure and 
recoupment.2  Indeed, one characteristic of many of these early decisions was that they 
addressed predatory pricing claims in markets where monopolization of any kind, let 
alone by predatory pricing, would have been impossible to achieve. 
 
 The first serious judicial discussion of the recoupment requirement appeared in 
the Supreme Court's 1986 Matsushita decision, where the Supreme Court observed 
that predatory pricing's success, and thus its rationality, was unlikely in the market at 
hand because there was no reasonable prospect of profitable recoupment.  The Court 
cited the Areeda-Turner article for that proposition.3  Judge Easterbrook's 1989 decision 
in the A.A. Poultry case then elaborated the requirement more fully, citing both the 
Areeda-Turner article and the Antitrust Law treatise (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015).4 
Judge Easterbrook noted the difficulties inherent in measuring price/cost relationship 
and took the easier route of considering recoupment in a market (egg production) that 
                                                          
2 E.g., International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling 
Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977). 
3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590-591 (1986). 
4 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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was competitively structured and where entry was easy.  The Supreme Court then fully 
embraced this view in its 1993 Brooke Group decision, which focused almost entirely on 
the recoupment requirement and again cited both the Areeda-Turner article and the 
Antitrust Law treatise.5  Subsequently, in its 2007 Weyerhaeuser decision involving 
claims of predatory purchasing, the Court held that under the Sherman Act a plaintiff 
must show both recoupment and prices below a relevant measure of cost,6 implicitly 
adopting an argument that predatory pricing claims should be dismissed in situations 
where doing so made no economic sense (e.g., Werden, 2006; Melamud, 2006). 
 
II. Impact 
 The effect of Areeda and Turner's predation test has been devastating for 
predatory pricing plaintiffs.  The effects occurred in two waves:  For the first 15 years 
after 1975 the courts focused overwhelmingly on the price-cost relationship, and it 
quickly became clear that proving predatory pricing under an AVC test is extremely 
difficult.  At the same time, the test produced a significant number of critiques in both 
the economic and legal literature.  The second wave of devastation occurred after the 
Supreme Court's formulation of the recoupment requirement in the Brooke Group case.  
Since then, few plaintiffs have won a case, and the incidence of classical predatory 
pricing claims has declined dramatically.7 
 The test has also been harsh on plaintiffs that have challenged more complex 
pricing practices, including such things as quantity or market-share discounts or 
bundled discounts.  Quantity or market share discounts are tied to either the volume of 
goods or the share of one's needs that the buyer purchases.  Bundled discounts are 
reduced prices or rebates conditioned on the purchaser's taking some combination of 
two or more different goods from the seller.  While the cases in these areas, which are 
discussed below are less unanimous and the Supreme Court has had little to say, the 
majority apply some form of price/cost test in these situations as well.8 
 Whether this harshness is good or bad depends on the frequency of successful 
predatory pricing and the economic harm that it causes.  If anticompetitive predatory 
                                                          
5 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993). 
6 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
7 One exception is Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005). 
8 E.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8th Cir. 2000), cert 
denied, 531 U.S. 979 (2000) (market share discounts not unlawful unless the fully discounted 
price is below cost); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(bundled discount not unlawful unless the incremental price for taking the second good is less 
than average variable cost); Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 
571, 580 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd on other grounds, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (similar).  
One exception is LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 542 
U.S. 953 (2004), which condemned bundled discounts without requiring proof of any price 
below cost.   See Areeda and Hovenkamp (2015, ¶749). 
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pricing is nonexistent or extremely rare, then we need not worry about false negatives.  
However, if it is more common, then the Areeda-Turner formulation clearly underdeters. 
III.  The AVC Test 
 Areeda and Turner made their predatory pricing proposal as a critique of vague 
and unsatisfactory formulations in federal court decisions prior to that time.  Some 
courts had permitted predation claims on fully sustainable, profitable prices -- that is, 
prices above any measure of the defendant's costs -- invariably leading to costly fishing 
expeditions for evidence of bad intent.9  Some decisions, including the Supreme Court’s 
Utah Pie case, had described predatory pricing as "below cost" pricing,10 or pricing that 
made competition "ruinous."11  While most of these cases spoke of pricing as having 
something to do with "cost," they said nothing about the relevant measure of cost or 
how costs should be classified when analyzing predation claims.  For example, Utah Pie 
spoke of "persistent unprofitable sales below cost," and of the legal requirement as 
“direct cost plus an allocation for overhead.”  The reference to "overhead" suggests that 
the Court was thinking of average total cost as the standard.12 
 Areeda and Turner responded by applying the simplest tools of microeconomic 
analysis.  First, they reasoned that, in a perfectly competitive market, prices are driven 
to short-run marginal cost.  Further, given that competition is an important goal of 
antitrust policy it seemed perverse to condemn prices that are above marginal cost as 
predatory, for this would force firms to hold a price umbrella over their competitors' 
heads and even act irrationally, in the sense that they would not be maximizing profits.  
Second, they observed, short-run marginal cost is difficult to measure from data that are 
collected in the ordinary course of business.  What accountants actually measure is 
past averages -- typically, a set of expenses that are divided by the number of units sold 
over a defined time period.  As a result, average variable cost is much easier to 
compute from accounting records than is short-run marginal cost. 
 Areeda and Turner then observed that in a competitive market in equilibrium, and 
with modest fixed costs, short run marginal cost and average variable cost are quite 
close together, so using AVC as a surrogate for MC would not produce significant 
errors.  They also observed an independent reason for an AVC test -- namely, that AVC 
ordinarily defines the "shut down" point.  A loss minimizing firm will no longer produce 
when prices are so low that it cannot recover its average variable costs (Areeda and 
Turner, 1975, p. 702 & n. 18).  As a result, prices persistently below AVC require an 
explanation. 
                                                          
9Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966) (finding predatory pricing without prices below 
cost); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944) (at or slightly below cost). 
10 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 703 & n.14 (1967). 
11 Porto Rican Am. Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1929), 
cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929). 
12 Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 696-699 & n.12. 
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IV. Critiques 
 That so many courts embraced the Areeda-Turner AVC test might seem 
surprising, given that contemporary assessments from economists were quite negative.  
The criticisms can be very roughly grouped into three categories: (1) AVC is a poor 
surrogate for short-run marginal cost; (2) the test seriously underdeters in markets with 
high fixed costs; and (3) short run measures such as AVC and SRMC are poor 
measures of strategic predatory pricing. 
 
1.  AVC as a Surrogate for Short-Run Marginal Cost 
 Even with the assumption that short-run marginal cost is a useful legal test for 
predatory pricing, AVC is a reasonable surrogate for marginal cost only in equilibrium.  
When average variable costs are minimized, AVC and short run marginal cost are the 
same, and a fully profitable price requires an increment to cover fixed costs. 
 "Classic" predatory pricing is not an equilibrium strategy, however, but rather a 
nonsustainable high-output strategy.  During the predation period it typically leads to 
output in an area where AVC is sloping upward.  To be sure, the results vary with the 
situation.13   Because predation strategies are not sustainable we do not ordinarily 
expect a predator to add structural capacity or build an additional plant simply to engage 
in below-cost predatory pricing.  The plant would be costly, and output will be reduced 
again during the recoupment period.  Also, in some situations the predator may have 
large amounts of excess capacity going into the strategy, with the result that the higher 
output that results from predation occurs in the downward-sloping portion of its AVC 
curve. 
 In what we think of as the more common case, however, the predator increases 
output from the equilibrium level, meaning that it moves into the upward sloping portion 
of its AVC curve.  In this range AVC and MC diverge, with MC being increasingly higher 
than AVC.  In these circumstances the Areeda-Turner test is a "defendant's paradise," 
in Williamson's words (1977, p. 305), in precisely those situations where predation is 
likely to be occurring.  Richard Posner echoed that sentiment a quarter century later, 
after the AVC test had largely swept the field, describing the formulation as "toothless" 
(Posner, 2001, pp. 218–219). 
2.  High Fixed Costs; Price Discrimination 
 The AVC test particularly underdeters in markets that are characterized by high 
fixed costs, which incidentally are the markets that are most conducive to exclusion by 
strategic pricing.  Strictly defined AVC excludes fixed costs and thus means that in 
                                                          
13 For example, if the AVC curve has a flat bottom the predator will have a range of output choices at price = 
AVC.  Areeda and Turner did not consider the possibility but assumed that the AVC curve was U-shaped.  See 
Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶740a.   
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many cases nonsustainable pricing strategies would be identified as legal, even though 
a significant subset of these might be considered anticompetitive under a more holistic 
approach.  Areeda and Turner (1975) did not develop this problem at any length in their 
original article.  They did suggest (p. 699), however, that an overly strict definition of 
variable costs (or short run marginal costs) would give defendants too much leeway, 
particularly if fixed costs were substantial. 
 In later years, after Turner was gone, Areeda and Hovenkamp (2015) attempted 
to correct for this problem by incorporating a broader range of costs into the definition of 
"variable."  For example, the treatment of plant and equipment in the Antitrust Law 
treatise (¶¶ 723d3, 740) considers "use depreciation" to be a variable cost to the extent 
that it covers "depreciation of equipment whose wear and need for replacement 
depends on the number of units produced."  That formulation has not met with much 
success in the case law, very likely because it greatly complicates fact finding, 
particularly for firms that have a complex array of durable equipment with differing lives.  
Indeed, multi-product firms with joint costs have been a severely complicating factor in 
all types of strategic pricing analysis, and such firms are in fact quite common. 
 Under the depreciation proposal durable productive assets that have finite use-
based lives are to be considered as part of variable costs.  For example, a truck or a 
machine that wears out or incurs maintenance expenses that vary with use must have 
these use-sensitive costs counted in as variable (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶740). 
While this approach makes some theoretical sense, it also poses significant 
measurement problems.  For example, while a truck or an airplane both depreciate and 
wear out with use, they also have capacity that is "lumpy," in the sense that increasing 
the load in the short term may cost no more than short-run marginal cost.  In this 
context, putting an extra box of cargo on an already-scheduled truck or an additional 
passenger on an already-scheduled airplane may contribute little or nothing to use-
based depreciation. 
As a result it seems appropriate to revert to a strict short-run marginal cost (or 
AVC) assessment when talking about these incremental loads.  However, this approach 
greatly complicates measurement, particularly when we are dealing with a defendant 
who made numerous transactions over a period of as long as four years in the past, 
which is the ordinary statute of limitation period in antitrust suits. 
 Fixed costs also encourage price discrimination.  Once the train, truck, or 
airplane is scheduled, any price for remaining capacity that is above incremental cost is 
profitable.  As a result, firms have a perfectly proper incentive to bid lower prices for the 
residual capacity (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶720).  Areeda's and Turner's original 
discussion of price discrimination in this respect was unsatisfactory, although they were 
opposed to any rule that regarded price discrimination as inherently suspect.  The 
problem was exacerbated by the long history of litigation under the Robinson-Patman 
Act, whose "primary line" provisions regarded price discrimination as almost inherently 
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exclusionary and anticompetitive.  Areeda and Turner recommended (1975, pp. 726-
727) that the same standards that apply to Sherman Act cases, including the AVC 
standard, be applied in Robinson-Patman Act cases.  In its Brooke Group decision the 
Supreme Court agreed. 
 Many instances of price discrimination are both output increasing and 
sustainable, assuming that the lower price exceeds incremental cost.  This indicates 
procompetitive behavior, even if the price excludes rivals.  On the other side, if 
predatory prices can be discriminatorily "targeted" at a particular rival, the effect is to 
make predation much cheaper than if the price cut must be across the board.  But this 
then leads to the problem that pricing above incremental cost is competitive behavior 
that benefits consumers (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶745). 
For that reason most courts have rejected the proposition that "fully allocated" 
costs must be the cost-based measure of predation, even in the context of price 
discrimination.  If that were the test, the defendant that prices selectively out of existing 
capacity would nevertheless be required to charge a price high enough to cover a pro 
rata portion of fixed costs. 
Instead, the proper test in these situations is short-run marginal cost or perhaps 
"average incremental cost."14  For example, if the cost of servicing an additional 
passenger on an already scheduled airplane is $25, then any price above that is 
justified even if other passengers are paying more.  However, it is difficult to justify a 
price below $25.  A fully allocated standard that requires the airline to attribute a pro 
rata share of fixed costs to the incremental passenger wastes resources and harms 
consumers in the short run. 
To be sure, one airline's "incremental" passenger might be another carrier's 
"primary" passenger, and may lead to the exclusion of the second carrier.  But this 
problem seems quite impossible to manage, at least if we assume that the defendant 
did not shift a large amount of capacity into the predation market in order to create this 
situation.  The generic cigarettes that were the subject of the Brooke Group decision 
were produced from existing capacity or from overruns.  Any price above short-run 
marginal cost would be profitable.  The Court stated that prices were in fact below 
average variable cost, and in such a case average variable cost (or incremental cost) 
seems to be the right test.15 
 Finally, the fixed-cost problem in many information technology markets, including 
IP licensing, cannot readily be controlled by imputing use-based depreciation.  For 
example, how does one apply AVC rules to pricing in products such as iTunes or 
eBooks, where incremental cost of an additional unit is about zero and the digital code 
                                                          
14Cf. MCI Communic. Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1118 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 891 (1983), which adopted long-run incremental cost as a test for a communication utility 
with high fixed costs. 
15 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 209, 217 (1993). 
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lasts indefinitely with no use based deterioration?  This is likely to be true, for example, 
under copyright law’s protection for life of the author plus 70 years.  Typically, of course, 
copyrighted goods have sufficient alternatives that predation is not a promising strategy 
for creating a monopoly.  However, at least a few of these markets may be structurally 
susceptible to monopolization.  Perhaps cost-based tests should simply be abandoned 
in such cases. 
3.  Longer-Run Considerations; the "Equally Efficient" Rival 
 The most fundamental critique of the Areeda-Turner test is that, whether or not 
AVC is a workable surrogate for short-run marginal cost, short-run measures are 
deficient because they exclude other types of strategic pricing behavior.  Longer run 
strategies may involve fully sustainable pricing. 
One example, illustrated by Williamson (1977, p. 305), is the strategic 
construction of excess capacity in markets where entry barriers are high because so 
many developmental costs are sunk and specialized.  Effectively, this critique was that 
the AVC test simply carved out large areas of strategic pricing and output behavior and 
made them immune from antitrust challenge.  Scherer (1976) made a similar claim, 
referring mainly to limit pricing. 
Those arguments invited an extensive debate about whether "profit maximizing" 
pricing by the dominant firm must be defined with or without regard to the impact of the 
pricing decision on rivals (Kreps and Wilson, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982a, b, 
1990; Klevorick, 1993; Edlin, 2002).  Baumol (1979, pp. 4–5) and later Edlin (2002, p. 
945) objected that the AVC test would permit selective, temporary price cuts pointed at 
new entrants.  Baumol proposed that such price reductions be legally required to be 
permanent for a substantial length of time (Baumol, 1979).  Tirole (1988, pp. 368–370) 
complained that a dominant firm could exclude by deceiving rivals about its true costs.   
 The two sets of critiques described previously are largely technical, in that they 
deal with measurement shortcomings in the AVC test.  The complaint that the Areeda-
Turner test ignores longer-run business strategies by dominant firms is much more 
foundational.  The questions are three:  First, do such strategies exist?  Second, can 
they be welfare reducing?  Third, can antitrust policy do anything meaningful about 
them?  The Areeda-Turner answers, fully reflected today in the Antitrust Law treatise, 
are either "yes," or "probably" to the first two questions, but a somewhat qualified "no" to 
the third, at least when the plaintiff's complaint is entirely about the defendant's price. 
 On the first two questions, the textbook microeconomics literature for decades 
has discussed such strategies as limit pricing, strategic entry deterrence, price 
responses to threatened entry, strategic construction of excess capacity, and the like 
(e.g., Bain, 1959, pp. 243-253).  Many of these strategies involve dominant firms that 
have cost advantages over rivals.  For others the firms may have similar costs, but the 
dominant firm's commitment and incumbency gives it effective cost advantages over 
rivals: it has incurred costs that they must still face (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, 
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¶¶736-737, 741).  One impact of the Areeda-Turner formulation has been to limit the 
reach of the antitrust laws to conduct that is capable of injuring a hypothetical "equally 
efficient" rival -- a formulation that Areeda and Turner included in their original 1975 
article (p. 709), and that is emphasized repeatedly in the Antitrust Law treatise today, as 
well as in the case law.16  Indeed, the concept of the equally efficient rival is inherent in 
the premise that only prices below the defendant's own costs are vulnerable to antitrust 
attack. 
 The "equally efficient rival" limitation is a severe one, particularly when one 
considers that predatory pricing is a plausible strategy only in markets that are 
structurally conducive to monopolization.  These markets are typically characterized by 
significant fixed costs and, accordingly, substantial economies of scale.  As a result one 
might well presume that in most markets that contain a durable dominant firm, that firm 
will have at least some cost advantages over its rivals.  Particularly when one considers 
the possibility of price discrimination, this means that a dominant firm can price in such 
a way as either to exclude rivals or to limit their output without ever seeing its own 
prices fall below short run marginal cost or average variable cost. 
 One interesting question is whether an "equally efficient rival" limitation and the 
requirement that only below-cost prices can be predatory are simply two ways of stating 
the same thing.  Clearly, if two firms produce identical products with identical costs in all 
respects, then only a price below the predator's cost can drive the rival out of the 
market:  What is sustainable for one will be sustainable for the other.  As soon as the 
firms are differentiated, however, the concept becomes harder to apply.  For example, 
two firms may have identical technologies and supply prices.  They may even have 
identical plants.  But if production is subject to scale economies, then an established 
firm with a large output may have a significant cost advantage over a newcomer with a 
small output.  The fact that the two firms have identical costs in the same range of 
output does not entail that they have the same costs in all output ranges.  The other 
side of the coin, of course, is that predation rules should never require a firm to keep its 
own prices above its rivals' costs.  For one thing, a dominant firm should not be 
presumed or required to know its rivals' costs.  For another, such a rule would harm 
consumers to the extent it requires a dominant firm to keep its own profits high for the 
protection of rivals. 
 A related efficiency problem concerns the dominant firm with "lumpy" excess 
capacity, as previously discussed.  For excess capacity that is already in place (such as 
the scheduled truck or airplane or the previously constructed plant), any additional sales 
above short-run marginal cost are sustainable and tend to be maximizing.  But these 
may compete with a rival's "core" business in which recovery of a portion of fixed costs 
is essential. 
                                                          
16 E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).  See Areeda and 
Hovenkamp (2015, ¶736). 
Hovenkamp Areeda-Turner Predatory Pricing March, 2015, Page 10 
 
 Bundled discounts also pose a problem for characterizations of equal efficiency.  
A firm that produces only product Y may have exactly the same costs for that product as 
another firm that produces both X and Y.  The first firm is equally efficient over the 
output that it produces, but it makes only one of the two products.  If there are joint 
costs, which are efficiencies that accrue to joint production or distribution of the bundled 
products, then the two firms cannot be characterized as equally efficient (Hovenkamp 
and Hovenkamp, 2009, pp. 1234–1235). 
For example, in PeaceHealth the defendant was accused of anticompetitive 
discounting of a bundle of primary, secondary, and tertiary health services.17  However 
the provision of these three levels of health services out of a common facility would 
almost certainly involve a great many common costs, both for durable equipment such 
as scanning machines and also of administrative personnel.  In that case a firm that 
offered the three services together could almost certainly undersell a firm that sold only 
one. 
Even with the assumption of no joint costs, however, sustainable exclusionary 
pricing is possible.  For example, suppose that the larger firm makes X and Y with costs 
of 10 and 5.  The smaller firm makes only Y, with costs of 5.  Current prices for X and Y 
are 13 and 6, respectively.  The larger firm now offers an XY fixed proportion bundle18 at 
a price of  17.  The price for the larger firm is fully sustainable (17>15).  However, the 
only way the smaller firm can sell its Y is at a price of 4, which is less than its costs.  
The dominant firm might even facilitate this result by increasing the price of its 
noncompeting product and then offering a bundled discount back to the pre-bundled 
price (Greenlee, Reitman, and Sibley, 2006; Elhauge, 2009).  As developed below, 
bundled discounts can present significant computational difficulties that the case law 
has not yet addressed. 
Problematically, any attempt to condemn above-cost prices as predatory requires 
the court to identify an appropriate standard.  Some mechanism must be designed to 
inform the defendant about how far above costs its prices must be.  Requiring the 
dominant firm to charge a price at least as high as a rival’s costs is silly, for it would 
benefit inefficient firms at the expense of consumers.  Requiring a firm to charge its 
"profit-maximizing" price presents intractable problems of both definition and 
measurement.  On the definition point, if "profit-maximizing" means that the firm must 
equate short-run marginal cost and short-run marginal revenue without regard to 
competitor responses, then the law would be requiring it to behave irrationally, even 
ceding its market share to rivals.  By contrast, if "profit-maximizing" simply means 
maximization of profits over any foreseeable time period, then the strategic pricing is 
lawful. 
                                                          
17 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2007). 
18 Permitting the proportions to be changed, as they can be in most of the cases, vastly complicates the cost 
analysis.  See Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp (2009). 
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As to measurement, a maximization test would require a jury to identify the firm's 
marginal cost and marginal revenue functions with sufficient precision to determine the 
price level at which they intersect.  The Antitrust Law treatise (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
2015, ¶736c1) concludes that the practical difficulties in making this determination are 
"insurmountable," suggesting that it would ultimately require "ongoing price regulation of 
firms found to have the capacity for engaging in long run anticompetitive pricing 
strategies," particularly as costs and market structure change over time. 
V.  Litigating Under the Areeda-Turner Test 
 The principal advantage offered by Areeda's and Turner's AVC proposal was 
administrability.  Pretty much everyone (outside of some courts) agreed that average 
total cost was not a good rule for predation.  Most instances of selling at a loss have 
much more to do with firm struggle or failure than with monopolization.  Measuring 
marginal cost imposes significant evidentiary problems, particularly when one is 
referencing a period in the past, purely historical data, and multiproduct firms that have 
numerous joint costs. 
1.  Administrability 
 What Areeda/Turner promised was a mechanism for testing predation by using 
accounting ledgers.  One simply needs to agree about which costs are to be considered 
as variable, and then divide costs by output during a given time period.  This promise 
proved to be very captivating to earlier courts and undoubtedly explains why so many 
embraced the Areeda-Turner AVC test. 
 In fact, ease of administration quickly proved to be elusive.  First, as noted 
previously, in order to avoid the problem of serious underdeterrence in markets with 
significant capital costs, some way had to be developed for including depreciation of 
exhaustible plant and equipment in the calculus.  But such equipment operates on 
different lifecycles, including obsolescence cycles.  Further, tax code depreciation is a 
poor measure of depreciated cost, largely because of its indifference to actual product 
lifecycles. 
 The administrative advantages of the AVC test are clearest if we imagine a firm 
that produces a single product, or one with no joint costs, with clear categories of fixed 
and variable costs, and with durable equipment whose use cannot be varied.  The case 
law has seldom presented such situations. 
 Of course, not every case presents these problems.  In some, prices are clearly 
above any relevant measure of cost.  In others, prices are below even direct inventory 
cost.  For example, if a retailer is paying $2 a gallon for milk and reselling it for $1.80, 
then the price must be below AVC no matter how other costs are classified or 
calculated. 
 Nevertheless, the numerous difficulties that the courts have encountered in 
implementing an AVC test lead to an important issue:  The Areeda/Turner test requires 
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antitrust enforcers to surrender a great deal of territory on the promise of a rational test 
that is more capable of being administered.  But if ease of administration is in fact 
elusive, then perhaps we are giving up too much and should develop a price/cost rule 
(or a non-cost-based rule) that is more receptive to plaintiffs and comes closer to 
dealing with our concerns about strategic pricing. 
 A great deal of Areeda's and Turner's caution, and that of the Antitrust Law 
treatise today, derives from the fact that the vast majority of predatory pricing cases are 
brought by private plaintiffs under circumstances where a trial will entail fact findings by 
a jury.  The cases are both very technical and contain a great deal of pricing and cost 
information that jurors are not likely to find engaging and is typically beyond their 
competence. 
As a result there is a fairly widespread belief that jurors are highly susceptible to 
evidence about "bad intent," while they are not good at assessing complex information.  
In that setting predatory pricing claims are likely to generate many false positives, and 
this in turn can have a harmful impact on aggressive competition.  One value of the 
AVC test is that it provides a test that judges can readily administer at the summary 
judgment stage.  A high percentage of federal predatory pricing cases are disposed of 
before ever going to trial. 
2.  Cost Classification Problems 
 The previously mentioned problem of lumpiness of fixed costs proved to be 
enormously complicated in the early litigation under the Areeda-Turner test.  For 
example, the prolonged Inglis litigation in the Ninth Circuit, which involved alleged 
predatory pricing of bread, turned into a battle of how to compute the cost of oven 
space, given the facts that ovens are durable goods, that the industry contained 
significant excess capacity, and that it cost no more to heat a 1000-loaf oven that was 
full than it cost to heat one that was only partially full.19  If the defendant bidding against 
a rival for an additional sale had to use the oven an additional time, then the cost of 
heating it should be counted in variable costs.  But if the sale was to come simply by 
putting more loaves into an already heated oven, then heating costs should be 
excluded.  This question might have to be asked about thousands of transactions over a 
multi-year period, and accounting ledgers would not necessarily provide an answer. 
 A related problem concerned joint costs and multiproduct firms.  Consider, for 
example, the retail grocer that adds an additional item to its store -- say, cigars sold in a 
wire rack from the counter.  Average variable costs would include utilities and employee 
wages, as well as inventory and perhaps some other things.  However, adding the 
cigars to a space that is currently vacant probably does not increase the load on utilities, 
and the amount of additional employee time would likely be so small as to make 
measurement impossible. 
                                                          
19William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 
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 Multiproduct defendants also invite complaints about "cross-subsidization," which 
have been around since before the Sherman Act was passed (Stimson, 1887, p. 134).  
The complaints generally reduce to an assertion that a defendant with joint costs 
allocates them in such a way as to permit selective predatory pricing that is sustainable 
because the firm is recovering its costs from other products.  The term "price 
discrimination" does not always capture what the defendant is doing, because it may be 
earning differential rates of return on entirely different products.20 
 Further, to the extent that costs are common there may be no nonarbitrary way of 
assigning them to one product rather than another.  The Federal Trade Commission's 
General Foods case involved alleged predatory pricing of coffee by a firm that made 
multiple products.  The FTC noted the difficulty of measuring the cost of one product 
when the “firm produces several brands of a product from the same plants, with the 
same workers and with some of the same raw materials.…”  In such cases “the precise 
allocation among brands or even the variable production costs can be arbitrary.” Indeed, 
even promotion costs had to be allocated, for promoting Maxwell House Coffee resulted 
in higher sales of both Maxwell House regular and instant coffee, but predation was 
alleged only with respect to the former.21 
 While the original Areeda-Turner article did not consider the problem, the current 
view in the Antitrust Law treatise, generally followed by the courts, is that in cases 
involving multiproduct defendants and the likelihood of significant common costs, 
predation must be shown across the entire product line, rather than just on a single 
item.  This rule very likely produces some false negatives, but it avoids the absolutely 
intractable problem of cost classification. 
One problem here is that even sales of individual products at prices that are 
below stripped-down incremental costs might be legitimately promotional rather than 
predatory.  For example, a firm might offer one product at less than incremental cost in 
order to get customers in the door where they are then likely to buy additional, high-
margin products.  Or alternatively, a firm selling a product technologically tied to a 
different product (such as printers and ink cartridges) might price the first product at less 
than incremental or variable cost in order to induce sales of the second. 
The cost of micromanaging every firm’s attempt to make more sales by shifting 
its price among different components of a transaction would be incalculable, with little or 
no benefit and very likely a great deal of harm.  Further, these strategies are nearly 
always sustainable.  That is, they do not depend on short-run use of the strategy in 
order to earn monopoly profits in the future.22 
                                                          
20 E.g., Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1988) (alleged predatory pricing of 
insulation, but not of storm windows, fireplaces, and doors).  See Areeda and Hovenkamp (2015, ¶742d). 
21In re General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 343 (1984). 
22 Following this approach is Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir 
1988). 
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3.  Average Avoidable Cost 
 As noted above, Baumol was initially quite critical of the AVC test.  He later 
qualified his views, however, and became more favorable to an AVC test defined as 
average avoidable cost (AAC) (Baumol, 1996; Bolton et al., 2000; Elzinga and Mills, 
2001).  An avoidable cost is one that the predator could have avoided by deploying its 
assets in a different way. 
The idea has a history in the case law that stretches all the way back to the time 
when Areeda and Turner wrote.  In the Transamerica Computer case the plaintiff 
argued that IBM anticompetitively introduced a new line of lower priced computer 
equipment, in the process abandoning an income stream from the older line, which 
became prematurely obsolete.  The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to convince the 
court that part of the cost of predation was the cost of forgone revenue from the 
abandoned line.23  One problem with using AAC in a situation such as this is that the 
innovation market might be competitive.  If IBM did not develop its new line of 
computers, someone else might. 
 In other situations, however, AAC may be a more realistic way of assessing cost 
by including the opportunity cost that the dominant firm incurs by not committing an 
asset to an alternative use.  For example, we typically think of an aircraft as a fixed cost 
good, given that it lasts many years and its costs show little variation with the number of 
people it is carrying.  However, the aircraft could be deployed profitably along a different 
route.  In that case the true "cost" of using the airline on the predation route is the 
foregone profits that it might have earned on the alternate route.  The government made 
this argument, once again without success, in the American Airlines case.24 
The court's rejection was an important opportunity lost, because AAC provides a 
tool for identifying nominally above-cost behavior that is non-maximizing in the short 
run.  Rather than computing marginal cost and revenue in the abstract, the AAC inquiry 
looks to a specific source of profit that the defendant relinquished in order to charge a 
low price.  Additionally, the AAC test provides a tool for evaluating behavior in situations 
where fixed cost assets are readily transferable from one market to another.  
Geographically, this could be an airplane or truck.  But it could just as easily be a plant 
with the capacity to switch back and forth between different products. 
Importantly, predation is a high output strategy, and the capacity to support that 
output must come from somewhere, with the assumption that the predation market does 
not already contain excess capacity.  As a result the ability to switch assets operates as 
a lower-cost alternative to constructing new capacity for the predation campaign. 
VI.  Long-Run "Compound" Strategies 
                                                          
23 Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 459 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983). 
24United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff'd, 335 F.3d 1109 
(10th Cir. 2003). 
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 One way to approach the long-run strategic problem is to shift the focus away 
from the "price" as such to a larger "broth" of anticompetitive behavior.  That is largely 
the approach that has been followed by the courts that have been willing to condemn 
above cost discounting practices.  These courts have for the most part not identified any 
particular above cost "price" as predatory.  Rather, they have considered pricing as one 
component of a behavioral pattern, often drawing on analogies that are taken from the 
law of exclusive dealing or tying. 
A good recent example is the ZF Meritor case, which held that the defendant's 
market share and related discounts and rebates violated the antitrust laws even though 
no price was ever shown to be below cost.  For example, one large customer was 
promised significant rebates over a five year contract period if it purchased at least 92% 
of its needs from the defendant.25 
Bundled discounts have provoked similar responses, with some courts applying a 
cost-based test loosely modeled after Areeda-Turner,26 while others have analogized 
the practice to tying rather than predatory pricing and permitted condemnation without a 
showing of prices that are below cost.27  Once again, it appears that the great majority 
of bundled discount strategies are sustainable.  Bundling immediately increases the 
bundler’s sales and revenue.  One might suppose that there are some 
counterexamples.  For example, one reading of the LePage’s case is that the defendant 
(the 3M Company) strategically included office tape in multiproduct sales to office 
supply stores in order to create a package price that single-product LePages could not 
compete with.  If revenue from other products was sufficiently high, then the price of the 
bundle could be above cost. 
 The so-called “attribution” test for bundled discount prices asks whether the 
incremental price that the defendant charges when it adds an additional good to the 
bundle is sufficient to cover the incremental cost (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, 
¶749d3).  That test addresses the question whether an equally efficient firm making only 
the second product can compete with the bundle.  Notably, however, it does not 
consider whether the defendant’s behavior is unsustainable, output decreasing in either 
the short or long run, or profitable to the defendant whether or not it excludes any rivals.  
It also raises the difficult problem that before one can determine whether a price is 
“below” cost one must be able to identify which price and which cost one is referencing.  
If one looks only at the incremental price of the second good, the price is below cost; 
but if one looks at the price of the bundle, it typically is not. 
If the bundled products are subject to joint costs of production or any part of 
distribution, then the attribution test yields false positives.  Suppose, for example, that 
                                                          
25ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012). 
26 E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008). 
27E.g.,  LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 
(2004). 
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the dominant firm makes X and Y with costs of 10 and 5 if produced separately.  But 
suppose further that economies of scope permit the two products to be produced 
together at a cost of 13.  That was very likely the case in PeaceHealth to the extent that 
the different levels of medical care shared common facilities or equipment with 
significant fixed costs.   For example, a durable piece of equipment such as a CT 
scanner might be shared for all three levels of health care that were bundled in that 
case. 
Suppose that a firm makes and delivers laundry washers and dryers.  The cost of 
delivery is $100, but once the truck is scheduled the cost of adding a second unit is 
zero.  In that case the firm that delivers both a washer and dryer will be able profitably to 
undersell a firm that sells only one or the other.  Charging a competitive price for each 
unit plus a $100 delivery charge for the pair will exclude a rival with the same costs that 
makes and delivers only the washer or only the dryer.  But that is an instance of purely 
competitive behavior.  In any event, a rival unable to attain otherwise available 
economies of scope should not be regarded as equally efficient. 
Variable proportions also complicate the bundling analysis, sometimes 
significantly.  For example, suppose that good A costs $5 to produce, while good B 
costs $7.  The dominant firm sells them for $10 each, with a 20% discount on a bundle 
that contains one unit of each, or $16.  A rival with the same costs for product B could 
not compete with the bundle.  It would have to charge a price of $6 in order to match the 
dominant firm's package price; this is $1 below the rival’s costs. 
But now suppose that the dominant firm offers the same 20% discount on A and 
B taken together in any proportion.  The customer wants one unit of A and three units of 
B.  In that case the bundled price would be $32 ($40 less a 20% discount).  The firm 
making only B could compete with this bundle.  The buyer would pay the dominant firm 
the unbundled price of $10 for product A, and might pay the competitor three times $7 
for product B, for a total of $31 (Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, 2009, pp. 1247-1253). 
The example exposes a significant problem in the analysis of bundled discounts, 
because many or most of them involve products where the quantities in the bundle are 
not fixed by the seller.  That was certainly true in PeaceHealth, as well as the cases 
involving Group Purchasing Organization sales of medical devices and supplies, which 
hospitals use on demand and in variable proportions (Hovenkamp and Hovenkamp, 
2009).  Whether a rival with the same product B costs is excluded depends on the 
proportion of the two goods that the customer wants to purchase. 
Alternatively, a customer might be able to deal with a rival by changing the 
proportion of its purchases.  The greater is the proportion of the secondary product, the 
more able the buyer will be to purchase from a rival.  A similar analysis applies when 
the bundle contains a large number of products, and the customer is able to choose 
which among them its wants to purchase. 
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In general, the more products the customer wants that are sold by a rival, the 
more profitable it will be for that rival to stay in the market (Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, 
2009, pp. 1238-1243).  Of course, there are limits on a customer’s ability to vary its 
proportions.  A hospital's proportions are based on its patient load, and other 
purchasers' proportions are largely based on consumer demand over which it may have 
little control. 
 Given the strictness of the Supreme Court case law on predatory pricing as such, 
the future of antitrust exclusionary pricing litigation will lie in complaints that de-
emphasize the "price" component of the defendant's conduct.  In order to win plaintiffs 
must seek to avoid the Areeda-Turner test and focus on other elements that can be 
analogized to tying, exclusive dealing, or perhaps some other practice.  Quantity, 
market share, and bundled discounts are providing the litigation arena for this battle.  
For their part, defendants continue to argue that these practices should be legal so long 
as the prices are sustainable, or a hypothetical "equally efficient" rival can meet them.  
That brings the practice back into the predatory pricing set, where defendants virtually 
always win (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶749). 
VII.  Recoupment 
 As noted previously, Areeda's and Turner's original formulation of their predatory 
pricing test included a recoupment requirement, but it was not elaborated; and the 
earliest literature and case law on the Areeda/Turner article paid relatively little attention 
to it prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Matsushita and Brooke Group. 
Once the costs of predation have been computed, the predator must also be able 
to expect a sufficient level of post-predation monopoly profits during a "recoupment" 
period.  Here the problems are also manifold:  First, during the recoupment period 
prices will be at monopoly levels, thus attracting new entrants.  Second, in a market that 
is structurally conducive to predation the merger laws would very likely prevent the 
defendant from controlling the disposition of the victim's assets. 
The predator's nightmare scenario goes something like this:  After a predation 
campaign the target goes bankrupt, but the predator will not be able to purchase it.  
Instead it or its assets are sold to a different firm at a price of (say) 10 cents on the 
dollar.  The result will be to give the predator a new rival, but one with much lower fixed 
costs to be amortized.  If the market really is conducive to prolonged post-predation 
monopoly, such an acquisition seems likely. 
 No one questions that predatory pricing is a risky strategy.  In order to assess 
recoupment the costs of predation must be measured with tolerable accuracy, meaning 
that an assessment must be made of the target's staying power.  In the Matsushita 
case, for example, the alleged predation had been going on for decades, making almost 
any period of recoupment unprofitable.28 
                                                          
28Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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By contrast, in Spirit Airlines the target of a dominant carrier's strategy was a 
small airline with few resources.  It was very quickly driven from the market, making the 
cost of predation low.29  The Sixth Circuit was willing to deny summary judgment on the 
predatory pricing claim, aided in part by Kenneth Elzinga, an expert for the plaintiff and 
the author of influential papers on the necessity for and measurement of recoupment, 
which the Supreme Court had relied on in the Brooke Group case  (see, e.g., Elzinga 
and Mills, 1989).  In the Spirit case, Elzinga concluded, the low cost of predation made it 
a much more attractive investment.  Indeed, recoupment occurred “within months” after 
the plaintiff had exited from the market. 
Spirit Airlines is a good object lesson for identifying the types of markets 
conducive to predation.  First, the overall size disparity between the plaintiff and 
defendant was enormous, but competition occurred only in the airports where Spirit 
operated.  Second, the ready transferability of durable assets (airplanes) meant that 
Northwest could easily flood the markets that were in play with additional capacity.  
Further, Spirit’s exit costs were probably low for the same reason; it was able to relocate 
its aircraft to less hostile territory and continues to operate to this day.  Finally, because 
fixed costs were so high, margins were also high, enabling recoupment to occur in a 
short time. 
Predation can provide benefits to the predator quite aside from the power to 
recoup losses in the post-predation market.  A well publicized period of predation can 
give the predator a reputation for aggressive pricing that will serve to warn rivals against 
future competition that is too aggressive.  In addition, these benefits can occur in 
markets other than the one in which the predation occurs.  For example, the predator 
who operates in a dozen markets might be able to intimidate competitors in all of them 
while paying for predation in only one.  Areeda and Turner never considered this 
possibility in their original article, although it is addressed today in the Antitrust Law 
treatise (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶727g).  The Brooke Group decision never 
considered the possibility either.  As a result most courts have ignored it..  One court did 
consider a claim that American Airlines engaged in predatory pricing on one route in 
order to enjoy recoupment benefits in multiple routes, but it then found that below cost 
pricing was not established in the allegedly predatory route.30 
 As currently formulated, the recoupment requirement goes far beyond anything 
that Areeda and Turner advocated and imposes unreasonable burdens on plaintiffs, 
principally because it requires just the sort of speculation about the long run that the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept in other contexts, such as proof of 
causation or damages.  This makes predation impossible to prove any time the 
recoupment period is greater than a very short period of time (Areeda and Hovenkamp, 
                                                          
29 Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005). 
30United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001), aff'd, 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).   See 
also Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Products Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 350, 2003 WL 21317277 (9th Cir. June 4, 
2003, unpub.), which sustained a complaint that the predator charged below cost prices in the market for baby 
cereals but obtained recoupment in that market in addition to a market for jarred baby food. 
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2015, ¶¶725-728).  For that reason the Antitrust Law treatise takes the position that the 
ordinary structural requirements for the monopolization offense should suffice.  These 
include a dominant firm, high entry barriers, and customers who are sufficiently 
insensitive to price increases (Areeda & Hovenkamp, 2015, ¶726; see also Leslie, 
2013). 
VIII.  Predatory Pricing in Oligopoly  or Cartelized Markets 
 In their 1975 article Areeda and Turner had virtually nothing to say about 
strategic pricing by a single firm in an oligopoly  or cartelized market.  They were 
concerned with dominant firms and strategies of destruction.  In fact, however, 
anticompetitive strategic pricing may be a more plausible strategy in an oligopoly market 
or cartel than in a monopolized market, particularly when the purpose is not to destroy a 
rival but rather to give it an incentive to change its behavior.  The point of the predation 
is to induce the price cutter to realize that conforming to the cartel’s or oligopoly’s terms 
will be more profitable than attempting to undercut it.  In that case, many of the 
problems of assessing recoupment could go away. 
 Nevertheless, it is also not clear that short-run marginal cost or average variable 
cost is a good measure of anticompetitive disciplinary pricing in an oligopoly.  Indeed, a 
price cut from cartel/oligopoly levels down to the competitive level or even above it 
might work quite effectively.  The whole point of the exercise is to convince the cutter 
that other members of the cartel or oligopoly are willing to experience short-run losses 
rather than ceding their market share to the cutter. 
 To that end, the Supreme Court’s 1993 Brooke Group decision, which Areeda 
unsuccessfully argued for the plaintiff (against Robert H. Bork), seems like an 
opportunity lost. 
 One other thing worth noting is that Section 2 of the Sherman Act reaches 
conduct that either “monopolizes” or constitutes an “attempt” to create a monopoly, 
which means that dominant firm status is threatened.  Predation intended to discipline 
an oligopoly typically does not fall within this category, and no monopoly was threatened 
in Brooke Group.  EU competition law uses different terminology – “abuse of a dominant 
position” – that is more amenable to such disciplinary predation.  For that reason 
Brooke Group and similar cases have generally not relied on the Sherman Act, but 
rather on the Robinson-Patman Act, which requires only that the conduct “may 
substantially lessen competition.”  
IX.  Conclusion 
 There is a great deal not to like about the Areeda-Turner test for predatory and 
strategic pricing.  The test nonetheless survives, mainly for two reasons:  First, it tends 
to keep predatory pricing cases out of court and away from juries; these are two 
properties that make it attractive to judges.  Second, and more important, no one has 
been able to come up with something better.  A superior test would have to correct for 
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the Areeda-Turner test’s false negatives without going in the other direction and 
producing excessive false positives.  In addition, it would have to be administrable by 
the full range of tribunals that are authorized to hear predatory pricing cases, which 
today includes jury trials. 
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